In this paper we demonstrate that, in a large population, if, for some domain of individual preference profiles, a voting rule satisfying anonymity, neutrality, and the Pareto rule is transitive, then so is the (simple) majority rule transitive. We also demonstrate that, unless a voting rule, F, is itself the majority rule, there exists some domain of individual preference profiles on which majority rule is transitive, but F is not. The two results, when combined, capture the sense in which majority rule is robust.
1

Introduction and Motivation
The rules that transform individual preferences into collective choice differ widely across institutions. In his pioneering work, Arrow (1951) offered a particular axiomatization of democratic rules and showed that they are not always coherent: unless restrictions are placed on the domain of individual preferences, the rules generate cycles for some configurations of preferences.
Although Arrow's formulation of democratic rules encompassed far more than majoritarianism, advocates of democracy have frequently adopted the narrower view that it is majority rule that characterizes an essential part of the democratic process. As Dahl (1989: 135) observes: "... virtually everyone assumes that democracy requires majority rule in the weak sense that support by a majority ought to be necessary to passing a law. But ordinarily supporters of majority rule mean it in a much stronger sense. In this stronger sense, majority rule means that majority support ought to be not only necessary but also sufficient for enacting laws." (Emphasis in the original.) While Dahl (1989, Ch. 10) observes that the term "majority rule" is not unambiguous, that it refers to a family of decision rules, it is the simple majority rule which receives by far the greatest attention in his exposition. Since, in the political science literature the qualifier is often absent when reference is made to the "simple majority rule", we will, for brevity, do the same and refer to the simple majority rule simply as the majority rule.
In view of the prominence that continues to be given in theories of democracy to majority rule, it is ironic that the most famous illustration of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem continues to be the Condorcet-cycle. To illustrate the Condorcet-cycle, consider three voters, who rank three alternatives (labelled x, y, z) as, respectively, "x over y over z", "y over z over x", and "z over x over y". Majority rule is intransitive under this configuration of preferences. To confirm this, note that, since two of the voters prefer x to y, majority rule requires that x be ranked over y; likewise, since two of the voters prefer y to z, the rule requires that y be ranked over z. By transitivity, x should be ranked over z. But since two of the voters prefer z to x, the rule requires that z be ranked over x, which is a contradiction.
Majority rule is, nevertheless, intuitively appealing. This is because it possesses several compelling properties, especially when applied to choices over political candidates. First, it satisfies the Pareto rule: if all voters prefer alternative x to alternative y, the rule ranks x over y. Secondly, it is anonymous: the rule treats all voters symmetrically, in the sense that the ranking is independent of voters' labels. Anonymity captures one of Dahl's (five) criteria for democratic decision-making (Dahl, 1989, Ch. 9): voting equality among citizens. And thirdly, majority rule satisfies neutrality: its ranking over any pair of alternatives depends only on the pattern of voters' preferences over that pair, not on the alternatives' labels.
Neutrality is symmetry with respect to alternatives. In the context of representative democracy, neutrality is a natural requirement of a voting rule because it prohibits procedural discrimination against candidates. Rules that violate neutrality have built into them preconceived rankings, for example, favouring the status-quo. If preconceived social rankings are to be avoided, neutrality is the condition that can ensure its avoidance.
But majority rule is not the only voting rule to satisfy anonymity, neutrality, and the Pareto rule. There is a vast array of others; for example, the 2/3-majority rule, under which two alternatives are considered to be socially indifferent unless at least twothirds of the voters prefer one to the other; the Pareto-extension rule, wherein two alternatives are considered to be socially indifferent unless all voters prefer one to the other; and, more generally, the δ-majority rule (δ > ½), under which two alternatives are considered to be socially indifferent unless a proportion of voters at least as large as δ prefer one to the other. Note though that if a voting rule is anonymous, it is nondictatorial. It can be shown that if a voting rule is neutral, it satisfies Arrow's condition of the "independence of irrelevant alternatives". From Arrow's Impossibility Theorem we may thus conclude that no voting rule that satisfies anonymity, neutrality, and the Pareto rule can be transitive if the domain of individual preference profiles is unrestricted.
As is well known, Arrow's theorem applies not only to direct democracy, but to many other species of democracy as well, including representative democracy (Arrow, 1963; Bergson, 1976) . So it pays to work within Arrow's original formulation, which we recount in this section.
Let X denote the set of alternatives. X is assumed to be a finite set, containing at least three elements. We suppose that there are N voters (i = 1,..., N). It is assumed that voter i has a complete preference ordering over X. Let R(i) denote this. So R(i) is a reflexive, transitive, and complete binary relation. In some applications, R(i) should be thought of as representing i's ethical preferences; in others, i's personal preferences; and so on. We may write the (N-tuple) profile of individual preference orderings, (R(1), ..., R(i), ..., R(N)), as R. Let F be a functional relation that maps profiles of individual preference orderings from a given domain of profiles to a reflexive binary relation R on X. We write this as R = F(R(1),...,R(N)) ≡ F(R). We will say that F is a voting rule if it is a complete, reflexive binary relation.
Voting rules need not be transitive. We say that a voting rule is a social welfare function if it is transitive. In other words, a social welfare function is a voting rule, F, the range of which belongs to the set of complete orderings over X. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem addresses the question concerning the existence of a social welfare function
We have gone into some of the wider aspects of Dahl's theory of democracy in Dasgupta and Maskin (1999) . satisfying a particular set of democratic criteria. The Condorcet-cycle, which illustrates that majority rule is not a social welfare function on an unrestricted domain of individual preferences, is merely the most well-known illustration of Arrow's theorem.
In this paper we will offer a new defense of majority rule: robustness. We will show that among all voting rules satisfying anonymity, neutrality and the Pareto rule, majority rule has the greatest reach, in that it is transitive on the widest class of domains of individual preferences, and is the unique such voting rule. Formally, we will demonstrate that if, for some domain of individual preference profiles, a voting rule satisfying anonymity, neutrality, and the Pareto rule is transitive (i.e. it is a social welfare function on this domain), then so is majority rule transitive on this domain (i.e. it too is a social welfare function on this domain). We will also demonstrate that, unless a voting rule, F, is itself the majority rule, there exists some domain of individual preference profiles on which majority rule is transitive, but F is not. The two results, when combined, capture the sense in which majority rule is robust. Maskin (1995) stated and proved this result for the case where N is odd. But the oddness restriction is discomfitting. It was necessary to invoke it in order to avoid pathologies that arise when, for example, exactly half the population prefers x to y and the other half prefers y to x. In this paper we will be interested in large organizations.
To formalize the idea that in such environments knife-edge cases are knife-edge cases, we will assume that the number of voters is a continuum (the notation will be introduced in Section 2) and prove a similar result in Section 3 (Theorem 1).
This restriction, that the number of voters is odd, was also invoked by Black (1948a,c) to show that if the domain of individual preferences are "single-peaked", then majority rule is a transitive voting rule. To remind ourselves of what can happen if the number of voters is even, suppose N = 2 and that, among three alternatives, x, y, and z, the first voter ranks x over y over z, while the second voter ranks y over z over x. These preferences are single-peaked but, as can readily be checked, majority rule is intransitive. Kirman and Sondermann (1972) have shown that Arrow's Impossibility Theorem holds if there is a continuum of voters, in that if a social welfare function satisfies the Arrow axioms, there is an In a remarkable early paper, May (1952) proved a characterization theorem for majority rule (reproduced here as Theorem 2). Theorem 1 suggests an alternative characterization, which explicitly invokes the idea of what we will call "maximal" robustness. We formulate it and prove it in Section 4 (Theorem 3).
In proving Theorem 1 we will need to determine which orderings must be omitted from a domain of individual preference orderings if majority rule is to be transitive on the domain. Theorem 1 tells us that if any other voting rule is to satisfy anonymity, neutrality, the Pareto rule, and transitivity, at least as many orderings must be omitted. Therefore, for comparison, we will examine specifically which orderings need be omitted from a domain if certain prominent voting rules are to satisfy these conditions on it. In Section 5 we examine the rank-order rule (or the Borda-count), the Pareto-extension rule, and the 2/3-majority rule (Theorems 4-6); in Section 6 random dictatorship and the plurality rule are examined (Theorems 7-8).
Sections 7 and 8 are about the extent to which the assumptions in Theorem 1 can be weakened. Transitivity and anonymity are relaxed in Section 7; neutrality in Section 8.
Perhaps the most familiar weakening of transitivity to have been explored in the social choice literature is quasi-transitivity (Sen 1969) . However, Gibbard (1969) showed that relaxing the notion of collective rationality in this manner does not make much purchase, because voting rules satisfying Arrow's other axioms on an unrestricted domain of preference profiles, while not dictatorial, are nevertheless "oligarchic". In Section 7.1 we extend the idea of non-oligarchic voting rules to a continuum of voters "invisible" dictator.
δ-majority rules were discussed by Black (1948b) . Blair (1979) has explored their axiomatic basis. Under Blair's axioms, δ is a function of the profile of individual preferences. So he refers to the voting rules implied by his axioms the "variable majority rule". Neither May (1952) nor Blair (1979) , however, was concerned with the robustness of voting rules. and prove (Theorem 9) that majority rule is robust among rules that satisfy anonymity, neutrality, the Pareto rule, and quasi-transitivity. In Section 7.2 anonymity is replaced by a weaker condition, individual responsiveness and it is proved (Theorems 10-11) that, while majority rule is robust, it is not maximally robust: weighted majority rules are also robust.
In Section 8 neutrality is replaced by the weaker (and much-studied) condition of "independence of irrelevant alternatives". We add a technical condition on voting rules, which enables certain kinds of ties to be broken. Analogous to Theorem 1, we prove (Theorem 12) that among rules satisfying these conditions the unanimity rule (with a given order of precedence) is robust.
Majority rule and the unanimity rule offer genuinely different ethical viewpoints, differences that have been much discussed by political scientists and social philosophers. The arguments that advocates of these two voting rules have advanced often differ sharply. However, social choice theory has on a number of occasions revealed that seemingly minor changes in the conditions imposed on voting rules can be significant changes after all. Theorems 1 and 12 can be read in this light.
Section 9 contains a summary of the results.
Voting Rules and Majoritarianism in a Large Population
Let X be a (finite) set of social alternatives containing at least 3 elements. It would simplify the analysis greatly if we were to assume that individuals have strict preference orderings on X (that is, if we were to rule out indifference on the part of voters). So let ℘ X be the set of all strict orderings of X. There is a large population of voters represented by the unit interval [0, 1] . For any ℘ ⊆ ℘ X we say that preferences lie in domain ℘ if they can be expressed by a profile P:[0,1] → ℘, where, for i ∈ [0,1], P(i) is Spitz (1984) is a fine advocacy of majority rule. The classic on the unanimity rule is Buchanan and Tullock (1962) voter i's strict preference ordering. We will confine attention to profiles P that are wellbehaved in the sense that their inverse images are Lebesgue-measurable, that is, P-1(P)
is Lebesgue-measurable for each P ∈ ℘ X . Let F be a function which, for each (well-behaved) profile P in ℘ X , assigns a "social preference" ranking, R = F(P), where R is a reflexive binary relation. We will say that F is a voting rule if it is a complete, reflexive binary relation. In what follows, we shall denote the asymmetric binary relation induced by R (also called the "asymmetric factor" of R) by P and the symmetric binary relation induced by R (also called the "symmetric factor" of R) by I. P and I will be interpreted as "strict social preference" and "social indifference", respectively. . In words, a voting rule satisfies neutrality if its ranking over any pair of alternatives depends only on the pattern of voters' preferences over that pair, not on the alternatives' labels. This is the standard definition of neutrality (Sen, 1970) . It is stronger than Arrow's "independence of irrelevant alternatives" condition. To see this, recall that a voting rule F satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives on ℘ if, for all profiles P and P′ in ℘, all Y ⊆ X, and all x, y ∈ Y, P Y = P′ Y implies that xF(P)y ⇔ xF(P′)y, where P Y and P′ Y are, respectively, the restrictions of P and P′ to Y. Notice that our version of "neutrality" incorporates independence of irrelevant alternatives, in that, if a voting rule is neutral on ℘, it is independent of irrelevant alternatives on ℘, [x,y,z] is the ordering in which x is preferred to y and y is preferred to z), then social preferences are intransitive (this is the Condorcet paradox). Nevertheless, on certain smaller domains ℘, FM avoids such intransitivities. For example, suppose that the domain of preferences on {x,y,z} is single-peaked; that is, for any ordering in the domain, if x is preferred to y then y is preferred to z, and if z is preferred to y then y is preferred to x, so that if [x,y,z] and [z,y,x] belong to the domain, then at most [y,z,x] 
and
There is a weaker version of neutrality, which separates it from the independence of irrelevant alternatives condition. In this version a voting rule F satisfies neutrality if for all profiles P in ℘ and for all permutations χ:X → X, F(χ(P)) = χ(F(P)), where χ(P) is the permutation of P over X. Our main result, Theorem 1 below, holds if the version of neutrality in the text were to be replaced by this weaker version and the independence of irrelevant alternatives condition.
[y,x,z] can also belong to the domain. It is simple to confirm that, except for profiles that are non-generic (in the sense that, for some x,y ∈ X, µ{ixP(i)y} = µ{iyP(i)x}), FM is transitive.
Robustness of Majority Rule
We will show that FM is unique among voting rules in satisfying anonymity, neutrality, the Pareto rule, and transitivity on the biggest possible collection of domains of preferences. To make this precise, consider a profile P and two alternatives x, y ∈ X.
The measure of (x,y) for P, call it m P (x,y), is the proportion of the population who prefer x to y; that is, m P (x,y) ≡ µ{ixP(i)y}. We will say that a set S ⊆ (0,1) is exceptional for a voting rule F and domain of preferences ℘ ⊆ ℘ X , if for all profiles P in ℘ such that, for all x, y ∈ X, m P (x,y) ∉ S (such a profile is called regular for S), F(P) is transitive. In other words, S is exceptional if it corresponds to population proportions that are problematic for transitivity. For example, the set S = {½} is exceptional for majority rule and a single-peaked domain of preferences: it is only when exactly half the population prefer one alternative to another that majority rule can fail to be transitive on a singlepeaked domain.
We say that a voting rule F is transitive generically on ℘ if there exists a finite exceptional set, S, for F and ℘. In other words, F is transitive generically on ℘ if it is transitive for those profiles on ℘ that are regular for S. Call a voting rule reasonable on ℘ if it satisfies anonymity, neutrality, the Pareto rule, and is transitive generically on ℘. We now have:
Moreover, if S is exceptional for F and ℘ and there exists a profile P on ℘ that is
The definition motivates the assumption that exceptional sets do not contain the point 1 (resp. 0). If 1 (resp. 0) were exceptional, w would be ruling out the profile in which everyone prefers x to y (resp. y to x). In other words, we would be ruling out the potency of the Pareto rule.
regular for S, such that F(P) ≠ F M (P), then there exists ℘′ ⊆ ℘ X on which F M is reasonable but F is not.
To prove this, we note the following prefer y to z, and everyobody else prefers z to y. Consider now a profile P 2 in ℘ which has the property that voters in [0, 2/q] prefer x to y and everyone else prefers y to x.
Since F is neutral, we may conclude that yR 2 x, where R 2 ≡ F(P 2 ). Continuing iteratively,
we can show for each k = 1,...,(q-1) that, for a profile P k , in which voters in [0, k/q] prefer x to y and everyone else prefers y to x, yR k x, where R k ≡ F(P k ). But consider P q-1 , in which everyone in [0, (q-1)/q] prefers x to y. By the argument just completed, yR q-1 x, where R q-1 ≡ F(P q-1 ). From anonymity and neutrality and the fact that yR 1 x, however, we conclude that xR q-1 y. Hence yI q-1 x. Consider finally a profile P″ in ℘ such that all voters in [0, (q-1)/q] have the ordering [x,y,z], whereas the remaining voters have the ordering [y,z,x] . Because yI q-1 x, anonymity and neutrality imply that xI″y and xI″z, where R″ ≡ F(P″). But from the Pareto rule, we have yP″z. Hence R″ is intransitive, a contradiction.
We conclude that F M is, generically, transitive after all.
We next prove the second assertion in the theorem. For ease of exposition, we will first offer a sketch of the proof. Details will then be filled in.
Assume there exists P in ℘ such that F(P) ≠ F M (P), where P is non-pathologic.
This means there exist x and y such that
Choose P * ′, P * ″ ∈ ℘ such that xP * ′y and yP * ″x. To illustrate the argument we will deploy, suppose there is an alternative, z, such that zP * ′xP * ′y and zP * ″yP * ″x, where z, x, and y are contiguous in P * ′, and z, y, and x are contiguous in P * ″.
Let P * be a profile such that (2) P * (i) ∈ {P * ′, P * ″} for all i, and (3) m P* (x,y) = m P (x,y).
Note that m P (x,y) < ½. Notice also that, because P is non-pathologic, (2) and (3) imply P * is non-pathologic as well. Since {P * ′, P * ″} ⊆ ℘ and F is, generically, anonymous on ℘, we may infer from (1) that (4) xF(P * )y.
Since {P * ′, P * ″} consists of just two orderings, F M is transitive on this domain.
In saying that z, x, and y are contiguous in P * ′ we mean that there are no alternatives lying between z and x and between x and y in the preference ordering P * ′. As we are at this point merely sketching the proof of the theorem, we assume that z exists. When we come to the complete proof, it will be shown that z does exist.
Let us now chooseP ∈ ℘X such that (5) yPzPx, and (6)P X-{z} = P * ″ X-{z} .
It can be shown (see below) that there do not exist three alternatives for which {P * ′, P * ″,P } constitutes a Condorcet triple. This means that F M is reasonable on {P * ′, P * ″,P}.
We now demonstrate that F is not reasonable on {P * ′, P * ″,P}. Assume then that it is reasonable.
Consider a profileP″ such that
From (7)- (9), we have m˜P ″ (x,y) = m P (x,y). But F is anonymous and xF(P)y. Therefore, (10) xF(P″)y.
Moreover, from (7)-(9) we conclude that m˜P ″ (y,z) = m P (x,y). But F is anonymous and neutral, and xF(P)y. Therefore, (11) yF(P″)z.
On combining (10) and (11) and using the fact that F is transitive, we have (12) xF(P″)z.
But (12) violates the Pareto rule and the fact that zP″(i)x for all i. Hence, we can take ℘′ = {P * ′, P * ″,P} to confirm the theorem.
It remains to fill in the details.
Choose P′, P″ ∈ ℘, such that xP′y and yP″x. Let P′ be a profile with the property that (13) P′(i) ∈ {P′, P″} for all i, and
By P X-{w} = P´ X-{w} we mean that P and P´are identical on the set of alternatives X-{w}.
(14) m P ′ (x,y) = m P (x,y).
Because P is non-pathologic, (13) and (14) imply P′ is also non-pathologic. Since {P′, P″} ⊆ ℘ and F is, generically, anonymous on ℘, we may infer from (14) that (15) xF(P′)y.
Since {P′, P″} consists of only two orderings, F M is transitive on this domain.
Suppose, for the moment, that there exists w ∈ X such that (16) yP″wP″x.
If there exists more than one w satisfying (16), let w* be the one such that, (17) wP″w*P″x for all w ≠ w* satisfying (16). Continuing iteratively, we can "convert" P″ into an ordering P * ″ such that, for all w ∈ X, (16) does not hold, i.e., (20) ∀w ∉ {x,y}, either wP * ″y or xP * ″w, so that F is reasonable on {P′, P * ″}. Moreover, if P* is a profile on this domain with m P* (x,y) = m P (x,y), then xF(P*)y.
Similarly, we can convert P′ into an ordering P * ′ for which (21) ∀w ∉ {x,y}, either wP * ′x or yP * ′w, so that F is reasonable on {P * ′, P * ″}. Moreover, if P* is a profile on this domain such that m P* (x,y) = m P (x,y), then xF(P*)y.
Suppose there exists z ∈ X such that (22) zP * ′x and zP * ″y.
If there are multiple such z, choose the one that is lowest in the ordering P * ″. Now chooseP ∈ ℘X such that (23) yPzPx, and (24)P X-{z} = P * ″ X-{z} .
We claim that there do not exist three alternatives for which {P * ′, P * ″,P} constitutes a We have been assuming that there exists z ∈ X such that (22) holds. A similar argument applies if there exists z ∈ X such that (32) yP * ′z and xP * ″z.
It remains to consider the case where, for all z′ ∈ X, (33) z′P * ′x ⇔ xP * ″z′.
Let z be the alternative immediately below x in P * ″, i.e., Choose Pz″ such that (36) Pz″ X-{z} = P * ″ X-{z} and, for all w such that wP * ″y,
wPz″zPz″y. Now, if there is a Condorcet triple in {P * ′, P * ″, Pz″} for some triple of alternatives, (36) implies that z must be one of the alternatives. Let {u,v} be the other two alternatives.
From (36) we have (38) Pz″ {u,v} = P * ″ {u,v} .
Hence, for a Condorcet triple, (34), (37), and (38) imply that {u,v} = {x,y}. But because yP * ″xP * ″z and zPz″yPz″x, we must have xP * ′zP * ′y, which contradicts (35).
We conclude that F M is transitive on {P * ′, P * ″, Pz″} and hence on {P * ′, Pz″}.
Moreover F ≠ F M on the latter domain. The rest of the argument is thus the same as that for the case in which (22) holds. _ Remark: Caplin and Nalebuff (1988) have studied δ-majority rules when the set of alternatives is compact and convex in the n-dimensional Euclidean space (n ≥ 1). In contrast to our undertaking here, they were not seeking to locate conditions on the domain of individual preference orderings for which voting rules are transitive. They instead sought conditions, both on individual preference orderings and on the domain of profiles, for which a given δ-majority rules generates a "social choice function" (SCF).
It will be recalled that an SCF, generated by a voting rule, is a mapping that, for each profile of individual preference orderings and each subset, Y, of the set of social alternatives, selects a non-empty subset of Y, each of whose elements is at least as good as any other element of Y. It will also be recalled that a voting rule can generate an SCF and yet violate transitivity (see Section 6, below). Caplin and Nalebuff uncovered a set of conditions on individual preference orderings and their profiles, such that δ = 0.64 (more precisely, δ = (1 -e -1 )) is the minimum value of δ for which the δ-majority rule generates an SCF, regardless of the size of n. But as they did not insist that the δ-majority rule be transitive, their finding is consistent with Theorem 1, even though the two results may appear contradictory.
Characterization of Majority Rule in Terms of Maximal Robustness
We shall say that a voting rule F is positively responsive on ℘ if, for all {x,y}, all Notice that positive responsiveness and neutrality together imply the Pareto rule.
Theorem 1 enables us to obtain an alternative characterization of majority rule. it will prove useful to examine specifically which orderings need be omitted if certain prominent voting rules are to be reasonable. In the next two sections we will investigate this.
Examples of Other Voting Rules, 1: Quasi-agreement
We say that domain ℘ reflects quasi-agreement if for all triples {x,y,z} there exists a member, say, x, such that (a) for all P ∈ ℘, xPy and xPz; or (b) for all P ∈ ℘, yPx, and zPx; or (c) for all P ∈ ℘, either yPxPz or zPxPy. 
Remark
Rank-order Voting (Borda-count)
Let Q be the cardinality of X. In rank-order voting, each voter assigns weight Q to his favorite alternative, Q-1 to his next favorite, and so on. For any profile P in ℘ and any alternative x let w(x,P(i)) be the weight (from 1 to Q) that voter i assigns to x when his preference ordering is P(i). Then, for all P in ℘, all Y ⊆ X and all x,y ∈ Y, the rankorder voting rule (or the Borda-count), F B , satisfies xF B (P)y if and only if {∫w(x,P(i))dµ(i) ≥ ∫w(y,P(i))dµ(i)}.
Clearly, F B is a voting rule. Moreover, it is easy to confirm that F B satisfies anonymity, the Pareto rule, and transitivity on the unrestricted domain ℘X. Only neutrality presents a problem. However, F B satisfies even this property on certain restricted domains.
Theorem 4: F B is reasonable on ℘ if and only if ℘ reflects quasi-agreement.
Proof: Suppose first that ℘ reflects quasi-agreement. It suffices to show that F B satisfies neutrality on ℘.
Consider two profiles P and P′ in ℘, a pair {x,y}, and a permutation χ:X → X As we will see in Section 8, only the "independence" part of neutrality presents a problem.
such that P ranks x and y the same way that P′ ranks χ(x) and χ(y , then xP(i)y, and if i ∈ V2, then yP(i)x. We claim that for all i ∈ V1 and all j ∈ V2 (39) w(x,P(i)) -w(y,P(i)) = w(y,P(j)) -w(x,P(j)).
To see that (39) holds, note that if for i ∈ V1 and z ∈ X, for all j ∈ V2. Similarly, if (41) holds for some j ∈ V2 and z ∈ X, then (40) holds for all i ∈
V1.
Analogous to (39), we can show that, for all i∈V1 and j∈V2, Next suppose ℘ is a domain that does not reflect quasi-agreement. Then, for some triple {x,y,z}, there exist P,P′ ∈ ℘ such that (43) xPyPz, and (44) yP′zP′x.
From (43) and (44), we have (45) w(x,P) -w(y,P) < w(y,P′) -w(x,P′), and (46) w(x,P) -w(z,P) > w(z,P′) -w(x,P′). Now, from (45) and (46), we can find a generic profile P in which voters have either P or P′ for a preference ordering, such that (47) yP(F B (P))x and xP(F B (P))z.
But (47) contradicts neutrality. _
Pareto-Extension Rule
The Pareto-extension rule, F P , is defined as follows: for all P in ℘, all Y ⊆ X, and all x, y ∈ Y, (i) F P satisfies the Pareto rule, and (ii) xI P (P)y if~{yP(i)x for almost all i} and {xP(i)y for almost all i}, where I P is the symmetric factor of F P .
Observe first that F P is a voting rule. By definition, F P satisfies the Pareto rule. It is a simple matter also to verify that F P satisfies anonymity and neutrality.
Theorem 5: F P is reasonable on ℘ if and only if ℘ reflects quasi-agreement.
Proof: Suppose first that ℘ reflects quasi-agreement. It suffices to show that F P is transitive. Consider a profile P in ℘ such that, for some {x,y,z}, xR Next suppose that ℘ is a domain that does not reflect quasi-agreement. Then, for some triple {x,y,z}, there exist P, P′ ∈ ℘ such that (43) and (44) hold. Let P be a generic profile in which all voters have either P and P′ as a preference ordering (and there is a positive measure of each). Since R P ≡ F P (P), we have xI P (P)y, yP P (P)z, and zI P (P)x, where I P and P P are, respectively, the symmetric and asymmetric factors of R P .
Hence, R P is intransitive. _
2/3-Majority Rule
2/3-majority rule, F 2/3 is defined as follows: for all P in ℘, all Y ⊆ X, and all x, y ∈ Y, xF2/3(P)y if and only if µ{iyP(i)x} < 2/3.
Note first that F2/3 is a voting rule. It is an easy matter to confirm that F2/3 is anonymous, neutral and satisfies the Pareto rule.
Theorem 6: F2/3 is reasonable on ℘ if and only if ℘ reflects quasi-agreement.
Proof: Suppose that ℘ satisfies quasi-agreement. It suffices to show that F2/3 is generically transitive on ℘. Consider a generic profile P in ℘ such that, for some {x,y,z}, But (54)- (55) together contradict quasi-agreement.
Next suppose that ℘ is a domain that does not reflect quasi-agreement. Then, for some triple, {x,y,z} there exist P, P′ ∈ ℘ such that (43) and (44) x. But this means that R 2/3 is intransitive. _
Examples of Other Voting Rules, 2: Strong Quasi-agreement
We say that ℘ reflects strong quasi-agreement if for all triples {x,y,z} there exists a member, say x, such that either (a) for all P ∈ ℘, xPy and xPz; or (b) for all P ∈ ℘, yPx and zPx. omitted from the domain ℘ (two from the first group of three, and two from the second group of three). But note that strong quasi-agreement is a more demanding condition than quasi-agreement.
Remark
In order to discuss the next two examples of voting rules that we wish to contrast with majoritarianism, it will be necessary to introduce further definitions:
We will say that a voting rule, F, satisfies contraction consistency (also called "Nash's independence of irrelevant alternatives" and "property α") on ℘ if, for all P in ℘, all Z ⊆ Y ⊆ X, and all x ∈ Z, {xF(P)y for all y ∈ Y} implies {xF(P)y for all y ∈ Z}. We will say that a voting rule, F, satisfies expansion consistency (also called "property ß") on ℘ if, for all P in ℘, all Z ⊆ Y ⊆ X, and all x, y ∈ Z, {xF(P)z for all z ∈ Z, yF(P)z for all z ∈ Z, and xF(P)z for all z ∈ Y} implies {yF(P)z for all z ∈ Y}. It is a simple matter to prove that, if F is a voting rule, contraction consistency and expansion consistency are together equivalent to transitivity.
Random Dictatorship
Random dictatorship, F RD , is defined as follows. It is a simple matter to show that F RD satisfies contraction consistency. We need, therefore, to prove that F RD satisfies expansion consistency as well. Consider Z ⊆ Y ⊆ X, P in ℘, and x, y ∈ Z, such that xF To prove the converse, assume that ℘ does not reflect strong quasi-agreement.
Consider a non-pathologic P belonging to ℘, such that xF RD (P)z′ and yF RD (P)z′ for all z′ Proof: Similiar to that of Theorem 6. _
Relaxing Transitivity and Anonymity
Are the conditions on voting rules postulated in Theorem 1 tight? In this section we shall relax transitivity and anonymity. (In Section 8 we will explore one particular route to weakening neutrality.)
As is well known (see Remark following the proof of Theorem 1), a voting rule does not need to be transitive if it is to yield a collective decision over elements of Y (⊆ X). In this context, a condition that has been much studied is quasi-transitivity (Sen, 1969) . In Section 7.1 we shall study the robustness of majority rule if quasi-transitivity replaces transitivity as a requirement on voting rules. In Section 7.2 we will demonstrate that anonymity can also be relaxed considerably even while retaining a part of Theorem 1.
Quasi-transitivity
We shall say that a voting rule F satisfies quasi-transitivity (also called P-transitivity) on ℘ if, for all profiles P in ℘, xPy and yPz imply xPz, where P is the asymmetric factor of R ≡ F(P). There are voting rules (e.g. the Pareto extension rule) that satisfy anonymity, neutrality, the Pareto rule, and quasi-transitivity generically on ℘X.
However, Gibbard (1969) showed that, in the case of a finite number of voters, all such voting rules represent "oligarchic" forms of collective choice: for any such voting rule there is an identifiable and unique group of voters such that, for all Y ⊆ X and all x, y ∈ Y, if any member of this group strictly prefers x to y, then xRy, and if all members of this group strictly prefer x to y, then xPy. In short, members of the oligarchy have veto power.
The idea of an oligarchy can be extended to the case of a continuum of voters. We shall say that an ε-veto set for a voting rule F on ℘ is a subset C ⊆ [0,1] with µ(C) = ε such that, for all profiles P in ℘ and for all x,y, if xP(i)y for all i ∈ C, then xF(P)y. We shall say that F satisfies no veto-power if there exists ε* > 0 such that, for all ε < ε*, F does not have an ε-veto set.
Theorem 9: Suppose that F satisfies anonymity, neutrality, the Pareto rule, quasitransitivity, and no veto-power generically on ℘. Then F M does too.
Proof:
The argument follows that of Theorem 1. As before, let q (> 2) be an Write by P the asymmetric factor of F(P). Then we can rule out xPy and yPx the same way as in the proof of Theorem 1. Suppose, therefore, that xIy, where I is the symmetric See also Guha (1972) , Mas-Colell and Sonnenschein (1972) , and Blau and Brown (1989) for related results.
factor of F(P). We can choose q big enough so that (1/q) < ε*, in which case xIy violates the condition that there is no veto-power. _
Individual Responsiveness
We can relax anonymity quite a bit even while retaining part of Theorem 1. We shall call a voting rule F individually responsive on ℘ if, for any integer q, any pair {x,y}, and any subset of voters V ⊆ [0,1] such that µ(V) = 1/q, there exist preference orderings, P, P′ ∈ ℘ with xPy and yP′x and a profile P -V for voters not in V, such that {yF(P)x} and yF(P′)x, where P(i) = P and P′(i) = P′ for all i ∈ V, and in either case P -V is the profile for all i ∉ V.
We may now prove Lemma 2: Any voting rule that satisfies anonymity and the Pareto rule on ℘ is also individually responsive, provided that, for all {x,y}, there exist orderings Px, Py ∈ ℘ for which xPxy and yPyx. So then suppose, contrary to the initial claim, that there exists P k * such that xP k *(i)y for all i ∈ V(k,q), yP k *(i)x for all i ∉ V(k,q), and yet (60)~{xF(P k *)y}.
From the fact that F is individually responsive, there exists a profile P -V(k,q) for the voters not in V(k,q) and orderings P x and P y , such that (61)~{yF(P x )x}, and (62) yF(P y )x,
where P x and P y are the profiles in which voters in V(k,q) have orderings P x and P y , respectively, and voters not in V(k,m) have the profile P -V(k,q) .
Let V x = {ii ∉ V(k,q) and xP -V(k,q) (i)y} and V y = {ii ∈ V(k,q) and yP -V(k,q) (i)x}. Now, if V x is empty, then (61) and the hypothesis that F is neutral contradict (60); whereas, if V y is empty, then (61) and the hypothesis that F is neutral contradict (60). Hence, we may assume that V x and V y are non-empty.
Consider the profile P′ in which: for all i ∈ V(k,q), xP′(i)yP′(i)z; for all i ∈ V y , yP′(i)zP′(i)x; and, for all i ∈ V x , zP′(i)xP′(i)y. Let R′ be the social preference ranking corresponding to P′. From (61) and (62), xR′yR′z. Hence, from transitivity:
(63) xR′z.
But because, for all i ∈ V(k,q), xP′(i)z, and for all i ∉ V(k,q), zP′(i)x, (63) contradicts ( 
where V(P,x,y) ≡ {ixP(i)y}.
We now note: . In other words, weighted majority voting rules are also maximally robust.
Non-Neutrality and the Unanimity Rule
A voting rule F satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives on ℘ if, for all profiles P and P′ in ℘, all Y ⊆ X, and all x, y ∈ Y, P Y = P′ Y implies that xF(P)y ⇔ xF(P′)y, where P Y and P′ Y are, respectively, the restrictions of P and P′ to Y.
It is well known that neutrality is sharper than independence of irrelevant alternatives, in that, if a voting rule is neutral on ℘, it is independent of irrelevant alternatives on ℘; but the reverse implication does not hold.
In what follows, we will relax neutrality in the following way:
Consider a profile P such that, for all x and y,
If F were to satisfy anonymity and neutrality, we would have xI(F(P))y for all x and y, where I is the symmetric factor of F. We wish to weaken neutrality so that ties like this might be broken. However, we will require them to be broken in a consistent way.
Specifically, we will say that F satisfies tie-breaking consistency on ℘ if there exists an ordering R F * such that, for all x and y, and some profile P on ℘ for which (64) holds, (65) xR F *y ⇔ xF(P)y.
Note that if F satisfies anonymity and neutrality, the "tie-breaker" R F * is the ordering in which all alternatives are deemed indifferent. Observe too that tie-breaking consistency is much weaker than neutrality: not only does it allow ties to be broken, but it applies at most to one profile satisfying (64). Indeed, tie-breaking consistency is restrictive only in that it requires R F * to be transitive.
Let P o be a strict ordering on X. We define unanimity rule with order of precedence P o to be the voting rule F 
Remark:
The ordering Po can be interpreted as prescribing an order of precedence. That is, if xPoy, then x is considered better than y unless almost everyone prefers y to x. Thus, the top-ranked alternative according to Po can be thought of as the status quo.
We now state a result analogous to Theorem 1.
Theorem 12: Let F be a voting rule that satisfies anonymity, the Pareto rule, tiebreaking consistency, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and transitivity on ℘.
Then there exists a strict ordering Po such that F u Po satisfies these conditions too.
Moreover, if there exists a profile P in ℘ such that , P) (
then there exists a domain ℘′ on which F u Po satisfies these conditions but F does not.
We will prove this via two Lemmas. We note first though that, starting from the voting rule F, we can create a two-person voting rule, F 1/2 , such that, for all P1, P2 ∈ ℘X and all x,y ∈ X, xF 1/2 ({P1,P2})y ⇔ xF(P 12 )y, where P 12 is the profile such that (66) If F satisfies tie-breaking consistency and independence of irrelevant alternatives on ℘, then, for all x,y and all P1, P2 ∈ ℘ such that xP1y and yP2x, (67) xR F *y ⇔ xF 1/2 ({P1,P2})y.
We now have:
Lemma 3: Suppose that F satisfies anonymity, the Pareto rule, tie-breaking consistency and independence of irrelevant alternatives on ℘. F 1/2 is transitive on ℘, if and only if, for all x,y,z: Hence, in all cases, the social ranking is transitive. We conclude that, for an intransitivity, at most one ordering may be omitted from some Condorcet triple. _ Let F o 2 / 1 be the two-person voting rule such that, for all P1,P2 ∈ ℘ and all x,y ∈ X, (65) for all profiles satisfying (64). Choose a strict ordering Po which is consistent with R F *; that is, for all x,y ∈ X, xP F *y ⇒ xP o y, where P F * is the asymmetric factor of R F *. Let I F * denote the symmetric factor of R F *. If there do not exist x,y ∈ X such that xI F *y, then we may conclude P o = RF*.
Suppose that, for some triple x,y,z ∈ X, (95) xP o yP o z.
Since F is transitive on ℘, so is F 1/2 . Hence from (95), the fact that P o is consistent with R F *, and Lemma 3, together imply that Next suppose that for some P on ℘,
Since P o is strict, we can assume (98) xP o y.
Hence, from (97) and (98), we have
Po (P)y, and (100) yF(P)x.
Let P oo be the "reverse" of P o ; that is, aP oo b ⇔ bP o a, for all a,b ∈ X. We claim that Therefore assume that F does satisfy these properties on ℘ o . In particular, this implies that the same tie-breaker R F * applies to {P o ,P oo } as to ℘.
Suppose, for the moment, that y is not the lowest alternative in the ranking P o .
Let z be the alternative just below y. LetP o be the same as P o except that y and z are interchanged. Let P o * be the same as P o except that z has moved to just above x. Finally, let P o ** be the same as P o except that x and y are interchanged. Let ℘* = {P o ,P o , P oo , P o *, But (108)- (110) imply that F is intransitive on ℘*. Hence we can take ℘′ = ℘*.
If (107) Since m P** (x,y) = m P (x,y), we conclude from (100) that (112) yF(P**)x.
Moreover, because m P** (y,z) = m P ′ (y,z), (111) implies that (113) zF(P**)y. Now m P** (x,z) > m P** (z,x). Therefore, if zF(P**)x, we can apply the same argument as in the case where (106) holds to conclude that F is intransitive on ℘*. Hence assume that (114) xP(F(P**))z.
But (112)- (114) if for some domain of individual preference profiles a voting rule is reasonable, then so is majority rule reasonable. It was also shown that, unless a voting rule, F, is itself the majority rule, there exists some domain of individual preference profiles on which majority rule is reasonable, but F is not. The two results, when combined, capture the sense in which majority rule is the most robust among voting rules that are required to satisfy the Pareto rule and to be (generically) anonymous, neutral, and transitive. From these observations we were able to offer a new characterization of majority rule, one based on the idea of "maximal" robustness (Theorem 3). This characterization complements the one offered by May (1952) and reproduced here as Theorem 2.
Majority rule satisfies anonymity, neutrality, and the Pareto rule on an unrestricted domain of individual preference profiles. Lemma 1 identified a necessary and sufficient condition on the domain of individual preference profiles for the rule to be generically transitive. (A different form of this condition has been called value restriction in the literature.) Theorem 1 tells us that a domain must satisfy at least as strong a condition as value restriction if any other voting rule is to be reasonable. In Section 5 three well-known voting rules, namely, the Borda-count, the Pareto-extension rule, and the 2/3-majority rule were studied. It was shown that they share the same necessary and sufficient condition for reasonableness (Theorems 4-6). A characterization of this condition, which we called quasi-agreement, was provided. As expected, it was found to be stronger than value restriction. The moral is that, if we were to judge voting rules solely in terms of their reach in being reasonable, these three widely differing aggregation procedures are the same.
In Section 6 two further voting rules -random dictatorship and the plurality rule -were studied. It was shown that they share the same necessary and sufficient condition for reasonableness . A characterization of this condition was provided.
As the condition is even stronger than quasi-agreement, we named it strong quasiagreement. The moral is that, if we were to judge voting rules solely in terms of their reach in being reasonable, random dictatorship and the plurality rule are the same.
These results allow us to group the foregoing six voting rules in a hierarchy. In order of decreasing robustness, the hierarchy consists of three groups: {majority rule}, {Borda-count, the Pareto extension rule, 2/3 majority rule}, and {random dictatorship, plurality rule}.
In Sections 7 and 8 the "tightness" of the assumptions (in turn, transitivity, anonymity, and neutrality) underlying Theorem 1 were studied. While majority rule was found to retain something of its robustness when transitivity was weakened to "quasi-transitivity" (Theorem 9) and anonymity was replaced by "individual responsiveness" (Theorems 10-11), dropping neutrality as an ethical criterion was found to have a marked effect. It was shown that if neutrality is replaced by "independence of irrelevant alternatives" and a certain technical condition designed to break ties (which we called "tie-breaking consistency"), then it is the unanimity rule, with a given order of precedence, that is robust (Theorem 12). Put informally, if a voting rule, F, satisfies anonymity, tie-breaking consistency, independence of irrelevant alternatives, the Pareto rule, and transitivity on a domain of individual preference profiles, then so does the unanimity rule with a given order of precedence satisfy them. Moreover, unless a voting rule, F, is itself the unanimity rule with a given order of precedence, there exists some domain of individual preference profiles on which the unanimity rule satisfies these conditions, but F does not. Theorems 1 and 12, therefore, tell us that replacing neutrality by independence of irrelevant alternatives in the notion of reasonableness of voting rules has a marked effect on its robustness. Perhaps we should not have expected it to be otherwise.
A question we have not addressed relates to what is known in the literature as "strategy-proofness" of voting rules. As the number of voters has been assumed to be a continuum, sincere voting is, trivially, compatible with individual incentives. What we have not investigated here are the domains of individual preference orderings on which the various voting rules are coalition-proof against manipulation. That remains a subject for future work.
